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A CRACK IN THE ARMOR?: HOW THE
REFORMS TO THE NEW YORK STATE HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW MAY EXPOSE WEAKNESSES IN
CIVIL RAPE SHIELD LAWS
Candace Mashel*
Civil rape shield laws exist to protect victims of sexual misconduct from
unwarranted intrusions into their private lives as they litigate their claims.
Gaps in current federal and New York State civil rape shield laws, however,
mean that victims of sexual misconduct still experience significant privacy
intrusions during litigation. These intrusions may have the effect of deterring
victims from coming forward. Part of the reason that these gaps exist,
however, is to ensure that defendants are given a fair opportunity to assert
defenses.
In 2019, New York revised the New York State Human Rights Law to make
it easier for victims to bring sexual harassment claims. The revisions
included the elimination of two commonly asserted defenses to sexual
harassment claims. The defenses that survived the revisions, however, may
force defendants to probe into plaintiffs’ private sexual histories more than
was necessary when more defenses were available. The reforms to the New
York State Human Rights Law, therefore, may have the unintended
consequence of increasing the use of tactics that deter victims from coming
forward.
This Note argues that New York should enact a civil rape shield statute to
better protect the privacy of sexual harassment plaintiffs, without further
limiting the defenses available to sexual harassment defendants, and
proposes the appropriate mechanisms for doing so.
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INTRODUCTION
“In July of 2013, I was raped by Charles Payne . . . . In July of 2017, I was
raped again by Fox News. Since then, I have been living an absolute hell.”1
These are the words of a woman who filed a sexual harassment claim against
Charles Payne and Fox News.2 In response to her allegations, Fox News
employed a tactic frequently used by sexual harassment defendants, known
colloquially as the “she’s crazy” or “she wanted it” defense.3 This strategy
seeks to shift the blame from the accused to the accuser.4 Fox News leaked
a story to the media about an affair between the plaintiff and Mr. Payne,5
claimed that the plaintiff pursued a sexual relationship with Mr. Payne to
advance her career,6 and sought sexual videos and photographs of the
plaintiff from men with whom the plaintiff had previously had romantic
relationships.7 These tactics can be traumatizing for victims8 of sexual
harassment who are brave enough to come forward9 and may deter others
from coming forward at all.10 New York State recently revised article 15 of
the Executive Law, the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), to
make it “easier for workplace sexual harassment claims to be brought
forward.”11 But are the revisions enough to combat the deterrent effects of
the “she’s crazy” and “she wanted it” defenses?

1. Emily Steel, Woman Says Fox News Banned Her After She Accused Charles Payne of
Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/business/media/
fox-news-lawsuit-charles-payne.html [https://perma.cc/R2AZ-FJ4W].
2. See id.
3. See Symposium, 2018 Symposium Panel Discussion: Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace in the #MeToo Era, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 45, 50 (2019); infra Part II.A.1.
4. See Symposium, supra note 3, at 50.
5. See Steel, supra note 1.
6. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
7. See id. at 56–57; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to
Quash the Fox Defendants’ Non-Party Subpoenas Duces Tecum at 3, Hughes, 327 F.R.D. 55
(No. 17-cv-7093(WHP)), ECF No. 38 [hereinafter Hughes Memorandum].
8. This Note uses the term “victim,” rather than “survivor,” to refer to individuals who
have experienced sexual harassment because the term “victim” is used in the legal literature
and statutes concerning sexual harassment. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. In addition, the term
“victim” may capture the diverse range of experiences of individuals who have been sexually
harassed. See Danielle Campoamor, Opinion, I’m Not a Sexual Assault “Survivor”—I’m a
Victim, HARPER’S BAZAAR (May 21, 2018), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/
culture/features/a20138398/stop-using-survivor-to-describe-sexual-assault-victims/ [https://
perma.cc/A7ZJ-9H3W] (“‘Survivor’ isn’t indicative of how I feel on any given day.”). This
Note also uses the terms “victim” and “plaintiff” interchangeably.
9. See Symposium, supra note 3, at 50.
10. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs’ Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions
Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J. 559, 562–63 (2002); Catherine A. O’Neill, Comment,
Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence: A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 219, 232 n.48.
11. See Dan M. Clark, Sweeping Reform of NY Sexual Harassment Law Is Signed by Gov.
Cuomo, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/12/
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This Note examines how current rape shield laws fail to adequately protect
sexual harassment plaintiffs in a manner that undermines the aims of the
recent revisions to the NYSHRL and how the revisions themselves may
inadvertently exacerbate this issue. Part I discusses the development of rape
shield laws to protect victims of sexual misconduct in both criminal and civil
cases before detailing the recent changes to the NYSHRL. Part II examines
(1) the ways in which New York’s current rape shield jurisprudence fails to
adequately protect sexual harassment plaintiffs and (2) how these failures
persist beyond the NYSHRL reforms—and ultimately undermine the
purpose of the reforms. Part II also addresses the legitimate reasons why a
sexual harassment defendant might seek evidence regarding a plaintiff’s
sexual history or predisposition, especially in light of the reforms. Part III
then proposes that New York should develop its own civil rape shield statute
to better protect the privacy interests of sexual harassment plaintiffs without
infringing on the ability of sexual harassment defendants to defend
themselves.
I. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME SHIELD: PROTECTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
VICTIMS THROUGH RAPE SHIELD LAWS AND CIVIL RIGHTS REFORMS
This Part discusses the development and current state of civil rape shield
laws and also describes the NYSHRL reforms. Part I.A discusses the
development of the federal rape shield law, its expansion to civil cases, and
its application in civil cases. Part I.B then explains New York State’s civil
rape shield jurisprudence. Finally, Part I.C details the NYSHRL reforms.
A. The Federal Rape Shield Law
Criminal rape shield laws protect the victims in prosecutions involving sex
offenses.12 These laws shield victims of sex offenses by preventing a
defendant from revealing details about a victim’s past sexual conduct.13 The
general purpose of these laws is to protect victims from unnecessary
intrusions of privacy.14
Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws, it was common practice for
criminal defendants to present evidence regarding a victim’s prior sexual
conduct during trial.15 Admitting such evidence, however, misdirected the
focus of the case and resulted in unnecessary intrusions into the private lives
of the victims.16 In addition, this practice discouraged victims from coming
forward.17 Recognizing that sexual history evidence has minimal probative
sweeping-reforms-to-ny-sexual-harassment-law-is-signed-by-cuomo/
[https://perma.cc/
SJ7Y-BZ7M].
12. See 124 CONG. REC. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
13. See id. This Note uses the terms “sexual conduct,” “sexual history,” “sexual
predisposition,” and “sexual behavior” interchangeably. See infra notes 30–32 and
accompanying text.
14. See O’Neill, supra note 10, at 219.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 225.
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value and may result in prejudice to the victims,18 Congress enacted Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 (“Rule 412”) to protect victims of rape from
unwarranted intrusions into their private lives.19
Rule 412 makes evidence of victims’ sexual history presumptively
inadmissible.20
However, because the Constitution grants criminal
defendants the right to present evidence and confront witnesses, Rule 412
allows admission of sexual history evidence in criminal cases in certain
express circumstances.21
1. Expanding the Federal Rape Shield Law to Civil Cases
In 1994, over ten years after the enactment of Rule 412, Congress extended
federal rape shield protections to civil plaintiffs.22 Like that of the original
rule, the purpose of extending Rule 412 to civil cases was to narrow the
inquiry, protect plaintiffs’ privacy, and encourage victims to come forward
with civil rape or sexual harassment claims.23 Rule 412 aims to safeguard
victims in sex offense cases “against the invasion of privacy, potential
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with the public
disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into
the factfinding process.”24 These protections are meant to encourage
“victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal
proceedings against alleged offenders.”25 As in the criminal context, Rule
412 now makes sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible in civil
cases.26
2. Applying the Federal Rape Shield Law in Civil Cases
Courts conduct a two-step analysis in determining whether evidence
sought to be introduced by the defendant is admissible in civil cases pursuant
to Rule 412.27 During the first stage of the analysis, the court determines
whether Rule 412 applies to the type of evidence in question.28 Rule 412
governs the admissibility of two types of evidence, namely “(1) evidence
offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2)
18. See id. at 224–25; see also Patrick J. Hines, Note, Bracing the Armor: Extending Rape
Shield Protections to Civil Proceedings, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 879, 883 (2011).
19. See O’Neill, supra note 10, at 219.
20. See FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (prohibiting sexual history evidence in the first instance but
allowing for its admission pursuant to certain exceptions).
21. See Hines, supra note 18, at 884.
22. See Laura E. Diss, Note, Whether You “Like” It or Not: The Inclusion of Social Media
Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control It, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 1841, 1859 (2013).
23. See id. at 1859–60.
24. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
25. Id.
26. Id. r. 412(a).
27. See Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining, first, that the
evidence at issue was subject to Rule 412 and then that the evidence at issue was inadmissible
pursuant to the Rule’s criteria).
28. See id.
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evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”29 The advisory
committee’s notes establish that “sexual behavior” refers to all activities that
involve actual physical conduct, such as sexual intercourse or sexual
contact.30 The terms “sexual predisposition” and “sexual behavior” are
meant to be interpreted broadly, however, and may also encompass such
evidence as “‘fantasies or dreams,’ ‘use of contraceptives,’ the ‘birth of an
illegitimate child,’ and evidence that ‘may have a sexual connotation for the
factfinder,’ even if such evidence ‘does not directly refer to sexual activities
or thoughts.’”31 The term “sexual predisposition” also refers to evidence
“relating to the alleged victim’s mode of dress, speech, or life-style.”32 If the
court determines that the evidence sought to be admitted by the defendant
fits into either of these two categories, then Rule 412 applies and the evidence
is presumptively inadmissible.33 If the evidence does not fit into either of
these two categories, however, then the evidence is governed by Federal Rule
of Evidence 403, and the evidence will be presumed admissible, unless the
plaintiff can justify its exclusion.34
If the court determines that Rule 412 applies, it proceeds to the second
stage of analysis.35 During this stage, the court will determine whether to
override the presumption of inadmissibility.36 The evidence in question will
be deemed admissible if “its probative value substantially outweighs the
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”37 This
balancing test is a fact-dependent inquiry and whether the evidence in
question is deemed admissible will vary from case to case.38
29. FED. R. EVID. 412.
30. id. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
31. Glazier v. Fox, No. 2014-106, 2016 WL 827760, at *4 (D.V.I. Mar. 2, 2016) (quoting
FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment).
32. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
33. See Wolak, 217 F.3d at 160.
34. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment (explaining that
Rule 412 “reverses that usual procedure spelled out in Rule 403 by shifting the burden to the
proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than making the opponent justify exclusion of
the evidence”).
35. See Wolak, 217 F.3d at 160.
36. See id.
37. See id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2)). This reverses the usual presumption that
relevant evidence is admissible and will be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Chamblee v. Harris & Harris, Inc., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 670, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403). The exceptions to the
presumptive inadmissibility of sexual history evidence are different in the civil context than
they are in the criminal context. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)–(2). In the criminal context, Rule
412 precludes the admission of plaintiffs’ past sexual conduct or predisposition except in
certain expressly delineated circumstances. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 560. In the civil
context, however, Rule 412 grants the court the discretion to determine “whether the probative
value of the proffered evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice to a party or the harm to
the victim.” Id.
38. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 585. Note that Rule 412 governs the admissibility of
evidence at trial, whereas Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
discovery of evidence. See Holt v. Welch Allyn, Inc., No. 95–CV–1135 (RSP/GJD), 1997 WL
210420, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997). The standard governing the admissibility of evidence
pursuant to Rule 412 is narrower than the standard governing the discoverability of evidence
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B. New York State’s Civil Rape Shield Jurisprudence
New York does not have its own statutory code of evidence.39 Instead,
New York derives its evidence rules from judicial decisions, statutes, and
court rules.40 While New York’s penal code does include a criminal rape
shield statute,41 the state’s civil rape shield jurisprudence is not very
developed.42 In determining the admissibility of sexual history evidence in
civil cases, New York courts have, therefore, looked to federal case law for
guidance.43 In Bumpus v. New York City Transit Authority,44 for example,
the Kings County Supreme Court cited a federal district court case that
applied Rule 412 and set forth “the standard” that “[i]n a sexual harassment
case, evidence offered to prove the plaintiff’s sexual behavior generally is
inadmissible unless its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to the victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”45 In Bumpus, the
plaintiff, a transgender woman, sued the New York City Transit Authority
under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), alleging that she
had been verbally harassed by a transit employee.46 The plaintiff alleged that
the harassment had caused emotional distress, which negatively affected her
relationship with her partner.47 The defendants deposed the plaintiff’s
partner and inquired about his sexual orientation and the types of sexual acts
in which he and the plaintiff had engaged.48 Applying “the standard” from
federal case law, the court held that this line of questioning was
impermissible and that “[a]ny probative value of the proposed inquiry . . .

pursuant to Rule 26. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 58
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Rule 26’s relevance requirement permits the discovery of information that
‘need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.’” (quoting Montesa v. Schwartz, No. 12 Civ. 6057
(CS)(JCM), 2015 WL 13016354, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2015))). However, in order to carry
out the purpose of Rule 412, courts tend to restrict discovery to prohibit inquiry into areas that
will not survive the Rule 412 balancing test. See id.; Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D.
132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996).
39. See William C. Donnino, New York’s Evidence Guide: The Court System’s ‘Best Kept
Secret,’ N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/09/10/
new-yorks-evidence-guide-the-court-systems-best-kept-secret/
[https://perma.cc/
6N2H-H7J5].
40. See id.
41. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 2020).
42. See Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (noting that “[n]either the parties nor the Court were able to find New
York State precedent addressing the issue” of whether the defense could inquire about the
sexual orientation and sexual activities of a third-party witness in a transgender discrimination
case).
43. See id.; see also Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 49 N.Y.S.3d 690, 692 (App. Div.
2017) (citing Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2000)).
44. No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009).
45. Id. at *3 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. QVC, Inc., No. 98-CV-38156, 1999 WL 1215577, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1999)).
46. See id. at *1.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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[was] far outweighed by the invasion of this non-party witness’ privacy
interest as well as the possible prejudicial impact of such testimony.”49
Similarly, in Rivera v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,50 the Bronx County
Supreme Court cited several federal court of appeals decisions in holding that
“private sexual relationships are essentially irrelevant in sexual harassment
cases, and that a plaintiff’s private sexual behavior does not change his or her
expectations or entitlement to a workplace free of sexual harassment.”51 In
Rivera, the plaintiff sued her employer, United Parcel Service (UPS), for
sexual harassment under NYCHRL.52 In preparing its defense, UPS sought
information about the plaintiff’s consensual sexual relationship with a
coworker that took place after the plaintiff’s employment had been
terminated.53 The court held that this evidence was inadmissible, quoting a
Second Circuit decision for the proposition that the welcomeness54 of a
sexual advance “does not turn on the private sexual behavior of the alleged
victim, because a woman’s expectations about her work environment cannot
be said to change depending upon her sexual sophistication.”55
C. The NYSHRL Reforms
In August 2019, New York State made several sweeping changes to the
NYSHRL, which reformed the state’s sexual harassment laws.56 Spurred by
“dozens of high profile incidents” and the #MeToo57 and Time’s Up58
movements, the justification for these reforms was to “abandon the
protection of those who would discriminate and sexually harass in the
workplace and recognize and serve victims of discrimination.”59
49. Id. at *4.
50. No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015), aff’d, 49
N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017).
51. Id. at *4 n.3.
52. Verified Complaint at 12, Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524 (No. 303092/2008).
53. Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524, at *4 n.3.
54. See infra Part II.B.1.
55. Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524, at *4 n.3 (quoting Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160
(2d Cir. 2000)).
56. See Clark, supra note 11.
57. The #MeToo movement is a social justice initiative against sexual assault and
harassment that was originally created in 1997, as the “Me Too” movement, by Tarana Burke.
See Nora Stewart, Note, The Light We Shine into the Grey: A Restorative #MeToo Solution
and an Acknowledgment of Those #MeToo Leaves in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693,
1698 n.18 (2019). The initiative was renewed in 2017, as the “#MeToo” movement, in the
wake of widespread publicity regarding film producer Harvey Weinstein’s long history of
predatory behavior toward women. See id. at 1698; see also Pooja Bhaskar, Note, Milkovich,
#MeToo, and “Liars”: Defamation Law and the Fact-Opinion Distinction, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 691, 693 n.2 (2019).
58. The “Time’s Up” movement is a social justice initiative that was formed in 2018 by
female actors, agents, writers, directors, producers, and entertainment executives to fight
systemic sexual harassment in the entertainment industry as well as in blue-collar workplaces
nationwide. See Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-harassment Action
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-uphollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/8A6S-ABV4].
59. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted).
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The NYSHRL reforms made a number of important changes to the state’s
sexual harassment laws. To make it “easier for workplace sexual harassment
claims to be brought forward,” the New York State Legislature (1) eliminated
the “severe or pervasive” standard traditionally required to sustain a sexual
harassment claim;60 (2) removed the Faragher-Ellerth defense as an
affirmative defense;61 and (3) expanded the definition of employer to include
all employers regardless of size.62 Parts I.C.1 though I.C.3 discuss each of
these reforms, respectively.
1. Eliminating the Severe or Pervasive Standard
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, New York followed Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196463 (“Title VII”) in requiring harassing conduct to be
“severe or pervasive” in order to be actionable.64 Under that standard, courts
look at the frequency and severity of the harassing conduct to determine
whether the plaintiff has an actionable sexual harassment claim.65 To be
sufficiently severe, the conduct at issue must be “physically threatening or
humiliating” as opposed to “a mere offensive utterance,” and it must
unreasonably interfere with the plaintiff’s work performance.66 If not
sufficiently severe, the conduct at issue must be sufficiently pervasive to be
actionable.67 To be sufficiently pervasive, the conduct must be “more than
episodic,”68 must be “sufficiently continuous and concerted,”69 and must be
“repeated.”70 “[I]solated acts or occasional episodes will not merit relief.”71

60. See Clark, supra note 11.
61. See id. (noting that employers will still be able to offer the Faragher-Ellerth defense,
but it will no longer be determinative).
62. See Russell Penzer, New York Breaks from Federal Sexual Harassment Standards,
N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/10/04/new-yorkbreaks-from-federal-sexual-harassment-standards/ [https://perma.cc/2EGH-VE9R].
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018).
64. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (App. Div. 2009) (affirming
the decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s NYSHRL claim on the basis that it was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive); Palmer v. Cook, 108 N.Y.S.3d 297, 311 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (noting that a
plaintiff must show that the alleged conduct was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” to state a
claim under the NYSHRL for sexual harassment (quoting Jones v. Mayflower Int’l Hotel Grp.,
Inc., No. 15-CVJ4435 (WFK), 2018 WL 3999586, at *6 (E.D.N.Y July 3, 2018))). Title VII
requires the harassing conduct to be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions
of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897 (11th Cir. 1982)).
65. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
66. See id.
67. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he required showing of
severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or
frequency of the conduct.”); Palmer, 108 N.Y.S.3d at 311.
68. Carrero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 577 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. Id.
70. Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992).
71. Id.
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The “severe or pervasive” standard does not capture a broad range of
conduct that falls between what might be considered “severe or pervasive”
and what might be considered a “petty slight or trivial inconvenience.”72
This high bar makes it difficult for sexual harassment plaintiffs to prevail on
their claims.73 In one case, for example, a circuit court held that three isolated
incidents over the course of nine months were not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to establish actionable harassment.74 In this case, the plaintiff’s
harasser: asked the plaintiff to watch pornographic movies and masturbate;
suggested that the plaintiff would advance professionally if he caused the
harasser to orgasm; kissed the plaintiff on the mouth; grabbed the plaintiff’s
buttocks; brushed the plaintiff’s groin; reached for the plaintiff’s genitals;
and gripped the plaintiff’s thigh.75
The revised NYSHRL proscribes harassment “regardless of whether such
harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied
to harassment claims.”76 In abandoning the “severe or pervasive” standard,
the revised NYSHRL makes it an affirmative defense “that the harassing
conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of
discrimination with the same protected characteristic would consider petty
This “petty slights or trivial
slights or trivial inconveniences.”77
inconveniences” standard, a lower standard than the “severe or pervasive”
standard, is applied under NYCHRL.78 The “petty slights or trivial
inconveniences” standard is intended to capture the “broad range of conduct
that falls between ‘severe or pervasive’ on the one hand and a ‘petty slight or
trivial inconvenience’ on the other.”79 Therefore, a broader range of conduct
is actionable under the revised NYSHRL than was actionable under the prior
NYSHRL or is actionable under federal law.
2. Eliminating the Faragher-Ellerth Defense
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, New York also followed federal Title VII
jurisprudence by making the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense available
to employers in sexual harassment cases.80 The Faragher-Ellerth defense
72. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 41 (App. Div. 2009).
73. See id. at 36 (“The rule (and its misapplication) has routinely barred the courthouse
door to women who have, in fact, been treated less well than men because of gender.”); Sandra
F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Boss Grab Your Breasts?: That’s Not (Legally)
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/
opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/6HFD-R43Q]; see also Deborah
L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now?: What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J., 377, 385 n.38 (2019) (collecting
cases).
74. See LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir.
2005).
75. See id. at 1100.
76. Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted).
77. Id.
78. See Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
79. See id.
80. See Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 928 N.E.2d 1035, 1039 (N.Y. 2010) (noting that the
NYCHRL, unlike the NYSHRL at that time, precluded the application of the Faragher-Ellerth
defense); Poolt v. Brooks, No. 110024/09, 2013 WL 323253, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18,
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applied when the employer could be held vicariously liable for the sexual
harassment conduct committed by the employer’s supervisory employee81
that did not result in the victim suffering a tangible employment action.82 In
those cases, if the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and rectify
any sexual harassment conduct and the plaintiff-employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or failed to otherwise avoid harm, then the employer could avoid
vicarious liability.83 The employer could exercise reasonable care by, for
example, maintaining an antiharassment policy with a complaint
procedure.84 The plaintiff would be said to have unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
otherwise avoid harm if, for example, the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use
the employer’s complaint procedure.85 Therefore, under the prior NYSHRL,
an employer could completely avoid liability for sexual harassment
committed by a supervisory employee merely by establishing an
antiharassment policy with a complaint procedure, if the alleged victim failed
to report the harassment using that procedure.86 Under the revised NYSHRL,
however, the fact that an employee did not report sexual harassment through
the employer’s complaint procedure “shall not be determinative” of whether
the employer may be held liable.87 Therefore, it will be more difficult for
sexual harassment defendants to avoid liability under the revised NYSHRL
than under the prior New York or federal law.
3. Expanding the Definition of Employer
The NYSHRL reforms expanded the definition of employer to include all
employers regardless of size.88 Prior to the reforms, the NYSHRL excluded
employers with fewer than four employees from its definition of employer.89
Similarly, Title VII does not apply to employers who have fewer than fifteen
2013) (“Under federal and state law, an employer vicariously liable for the discriminatory
conduct of a managerial or supervisory employee may elude liability by asserting the so-called
Faragher-Ellerth defense.”).
81. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 744 (1998). A supervisory employee
is an employee “empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the
victim.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
82. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. A tangible employment action is “a significant change
in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
See id. at 761.
83. See id. at 745.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Many victims of sexual harassment refrain from reporting misconduct through
internal complaint procedures because of fear of retaliation and because of inadequate
protections against retaliation. See Kate W. Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure:
The Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 463,
477–88 (2018).
87. Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted).
88. See Penzer, supra note 62.
89. See Assemb. 08421.
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employees.90 Therefore, under the revised NYSHRL, plaintiffs will be able
to pursue claims against employers who could not be sued under the prior
law and cannot be sued under Title VII.
II. HOW THE NYSHRL REFORMS MAY EXPOSE GAPS IN THE CIVIL
RAPE SHIELD LAWS AND WHY THOSE GAPS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO
FIX
The purpose of civil rape shield laws is to protect alleged victims of sexual
misconduct from the “invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and
sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate
sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding
process” and to encourage “victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to
participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”91 Rule 412 and
New York common law seek to achieve these objectives in civil cases by
barring evidence offered to prove the alleged victim’s sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition, unless the probative value of such evidence
significantly outweighs the possible harm to the victim.92 Despite these laws,
however, many plaintiffs in civil sexual misconduct cases continue to
experience invasions of privacy as their claims are litigated.93 To that end,
Part II.A examines how gaps in Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield
jurisprudence prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from securing full
protection. Part II.B then discusses why these shortcomings may be
unavoidable if defendants are to be given a fair trial. Finally, Part II.C
examines how the NYSHRL reforms might exacerbate the dueling interests
of (1) fully protecting sexual harassment plaintiffs from privacy invasions in
order to encourage victims to come forward and (2) providing sexual
harassment defendants with a fair trial.
A. How Current Rape Shield Laws Fail to Adequately Protect Sexual
Harassment Victims
This section discusses how gaps in current rape shield laws fail to
adequately protect sexual harassment victims. Part II.A.1 discusses how the
shortcomings of Rule 412 prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from securing
full protection. Part II.A.2 discusses how the shortcomings of New York’s
civil rape shield common law prevent sexual harassment plaintiffs from
securing full protection.

90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018).
91. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
92. See id.; Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (citing Fitzpatrick v. QVC, Inc., No. 98–CV–3815, 1999 WL 1215577,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1999)).
93. See infra Part II.A.
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1. The Weaknesses of Rule 412
In Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.,94 the plaintiff, a female guest
television contributor, sued Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Fox) and
Charles Payne, among others, under Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the
NYCHRL.95 The crux of the plaintiff’s allegations was that Mr. Payne had
sexually harassed her.96 The defendants argued that the plaintiff and Mr.
Payne had had a consensual relationship and that this relationship was
consistent with the plaintiff’s history of pursuing conservative media figures
and politicians who she believed could advance her career.97 To bolster this
defense, the defendants subpoenaed four men formerly involved in affairs
with the plaintiff, seeking evidence of the plaintiff’s purported pattern of
pursuing men to boost her career.98 The subpoenas sought “sexual or
romantic communications between [the plaintiff] and each of the men,
information regarding [the plaintiff’s] personal background and reputation,
and media files of a sexual or romantic nature depicting [the plaintiff].”99 In
response, the plaintiff moved to quash the subpoenas, arguing that none of
the subpoenaed men had ever been employees of Fox; they did not have any
information pertaining to the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant; and the
real, and only, purpose of the subpoenas was to harass, humiliate, and punish
the plaintiff.100
Applying Rule 412, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash the
subpoenas, concluding that “the prejudice arising from [the plaintiff’s] prior
sexual history with other men would outweigh what little relevance [such
evidence] may bring to [the] case.”101 The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s
sexual relationships with nonparties who had no connection to claims of the
case would distract the parties, as well as a jury, from the real issues in the
case.102 Further, the court noted that the “[d]efendants’ purported strategy is
superficially appealing, but advances a boorish, reductive narrative that [the
plaintiff] was predisposed to engaging in self-serving sexual relationships”
and that the plaintiff’s “prior sexual history [had] no relevance to her claims
against [Mr.] Payne, or [to] the defense that she used [Mr.] Payne to advance
her career at Fox.”103
In Hughes, the plaintiff successfully invoked Rule 412 to block the
defendants from obtaining, among other things, “[s]exual or romantic
communications” between the plaintiff and “persons other than her husband”
and “[v]ideos, audios or photos” of the plaintiff “of a sexual or romantic

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

327 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
See id. at 57; Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1.
See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 57; see also Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1.
See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 57.
Id. at 56–57.
See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1.
Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58.
See id.
Id.
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nature” from third parties.104 In that respect, Rule 412 achieved its purpose
by protecting the plaintiff from the significant invasion of privacy that would
result from the third-party production of such sensitive materials.105 The
Rule did not, however, protect the plaintiff from the invasion of privacy that
attended the third-party subpoenas themselves, or that resulted from having
to oppose the subpoenas.106 Regardless of its ultimate success in obtaining
the requested materials, a subpoena served on a sexual harassment victim’s
prior sexual partners seeking sexual videos and photos of the victim may in
itself constitute an invasion of privacy.107 The plaintiff in Hughes made clear
in her motion to quash the subpoenas that she viewed the subpoenas as an
attempt to “humiliate” and “shame” her.108 This type of embarrassment
could have the effect of deterring victims of sexual harassment from pursuing
their claims.109 The traumatic impact it had on the plaintiff in Hughes was
evident in her statement that she felt attacked by Fox News.110 This
statement reflects the effect that the third-party subpoenas had on the
plaintiff, even though the subpoenas were ultimately quashed on Rule 412
grounds, suggesting that Rule 412 did not fully achieve its purpose in
Hughes.111
2. The Weaknesses of New York Common Law
Because New York State’s civil rape shield jurisprudence derives from
Rule 412 case law,112 it follows that New York State’s civil rape shield
common law suffers from shortcomings similar to those of Rule 412. These
shortcomings are illustrated in Rivera v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
The plaintiff in Rivera sued her employer, UPS, for sexual harassment
under the NYCHRL.113 The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor at UPS
sexually harassed her by, among other things, stating that the plaintiff
sexually aroused him and that he wanted to have sex with the plaintiff,
making comments about the plaintiff’s genitalia, and showing up drunk at
the plaintiff’s house in the middle of the night on several occasions.114 In
defense, UPS sought information regarding a consensual sexual relationship
that the plaintiff had with a UPS employee after the plaintiff’s employment
with the company had been terminated.115 The apparent purpose of this

104. Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58; Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
105. See supra Part I.A.1.
106. See Hughes Memorandum, supra note 7, at 5–6.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 562–63.
110. See Steel, supra note 1.
111. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58.
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. Verified Complaint, supra note 52, at 12.
114. See id. at 3.
115. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524, at *3 n.3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015), aff’d, 49 N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017).
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evidence was to blame116 the plaintiff for her supervisor’s alleged conduct
by showing that the plaintiff was generally welcoming of such conduct.117
The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, in part, thereby
prohibiting UPS from deposing the UPS employee with whom the plaintiff
had had a consensual sexual relationship.118
The New York State common law, as derived from federal case law on
Rule 412,119 successfully protected the plaintiff in Rivera from the significant
invasion of privacy that would result from responding to inquiries about her
private sexual relationships and the prejudice that would result from
admitting such evidence.120 As in Hughes, however, the law did not fully
protect the plaintiff in Rivera from the invasion of privacy that attended such
discovery tactics.121 Regardless of the ultimate success in obtaining the
requested information, an inquiry into a sexual harassment victim’s private
sexual relationships may in itself constitute an invasion of privacy.122 The
plaintiff’s counsel in Rivera made clear in the motion for a protective order
that the plaintiff viewed such discovery tactics as “[an attempt] to smear her
reputation,” and that the plaintiff found these tactics to be “extremely
upsetting,” “demean[ing] and humiliat[ing].”123 This type of humiliation
could have the effect of deterring victims of sexual harassment from pursuing
their claims.124 In Rivera, this was noted in the plaintiff’s motion for a
protective order, which stated, “to leave every sexual harassment plaintiff
vulnerable to an . . . assault on their personal lives in an effort to portray her
personal life as somehow welcoming sexual harassment, risks chilling all
sexual harassment victims from complaining.”125 This statement reflects the
deterrent effect that invasive discovery tactics, such as those used by UPS in
Rivera, can have on sexual harassment plaintiffs, even when the court
ultimately rules that the defendant is not entitled to such discovery. This
suggests that New York State’s common law does not adequately protect the
privacy interests of sexual harassment victims.

116. Affirmation in Support of Order to Show Cause for a Protective Order & in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion at 3, Rivera, 2015 WL 13345524 (No. 303092/2008) [hereinafter
Rivera Affirmation].
117. See id. at 5.
118. See Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 49 N.Y.S.3d 690, 692 (App. Div. 2017).
119. See supra Part I.B.
120. See Rivera, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 692.
121. See supra Part II.A.1.
122. Rivera Affirmation, supra note 116, at 3–4.
123. See id.
124. See Aiken, supra note 10, at 562–63.
125. Rivera Affirmation, supra note 116, at 5.
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B. Limiting Civil Rape Shield Laws to Preserve Defendants’ Substantive
Legal Rights
Critics of civil rape shield laws have argued that the exclusion of sexual
history evidence deprives defendants of their substantive legal rights.126 If,
for example, a defendant is prohibited from presenting evidence to establish
welcomeness, it will be easier for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case127
of sexual harassment.128 Because civil rape shield laws do not categorically
bar defendants from accessing essential evidence, however, they do not
deprive defendants of their substantive legal rights.129
Civil rape shield laws do not categorically bar defendants from accessing
essential evidence but instead ban evidence only when defendants cannot
show that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the
danger of harm to the victim or unfair prejudice to any party.130 Because
civil rape shield laws will allow defendants access to evidence if the
defendants can make the required showing, civil rape shield laws do not
deprive defendants of their substantive legal rights.131 This section describes
two common scenarios in which courts tend to hold that the probative value
of the evidence sought outweighs the harm to the sexual harassment plaintiff.
Part II.B.1 discusses the scenario in which the defendant argues that the
plaintiff welcomed the alleged harassing conduct. Part II.B.2 discusses the
scenario in which the plaintiff seeks compensation based on mental anguish.
Both scenarios exemplify why allowing defendants to delve into certain
private aspects of an alleged sexual harassment victim’s sexual history is
sometimes essential to preserve the substantive legal rights of sexual
harassment defendants.
1. Proving Welcomeness
To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under either Title VII
or the NYSHRL, plaintiffs must show that they were subject to “unwelcome”
sexual advances.132 Defense lawyers use this element of a plaintiff’s prima
facie case to discover and admit evidence regarding the victim’s prior sexual
behavior in order to show that the victim invited or provoked the alleged
conduct.133 This is similar to the defense asserted in Hughes.134 There, the
126. Paul Nicholas Monnin, Special Project, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of
Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to
Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1183–84 (1995).
127. See infra Part II.B.1.
128. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1183–84.
129. See id.
130. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2); Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 3512/07, 2009 WL
1141401, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009).
131. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1184.
132. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-b(2)(a) (McKinney 2020) (“It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice for an employer to . . . engage in unwelcome sexual advances . . . to
a . . . worker . . . .”); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (noting that
the “gravamen” of sexual harassment claims is that harassing conduct is unwelcome).
133. See Monnin, supra note 126, at 1156.
134. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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defendants essentially argued that Mr. Payne’s conduct was not unwelcome
but rather that the plaintiff had pursued Mr. Payne to advance her career.135
Where a defendant raises such a defense, the court may have to allow the
defendant to delve into some aspects of an alleged sexual harassment victim’s
sexual history or behavior, if necessary to show that the victim actually
incited or invited the conduct. In Hughes, for example, although the court
granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash the third-party subpoenas, the court
noted that the defendants could seek discovery from the plaintiff, Mr. Payne,
and others at Fox, instead of obtaining evidence from third parties, to show
that the plaintiff had used Mr. Payne to advance her career.136 The court
noted that evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s sexual history with other men
was off limits because the prejudice arising from such evidence would
outweigh what little relevance it would bring to the case.137 However,
because the plaintiff had acknowledged that rumors that she engaged in “selfaggrandizing conduct with other men” had “‘long dogged her career,’” the
defendants could directly depose the plaintiff regarding her reputation for
engaging in such conduct.138 In addition to highlighting the shortfalls of Rule
412’s protections,139 therefore, Hughes also exemplifies why defendants
must sometimes be allowed to delve into certain aspects of an alleged sexual
harassment victim’s sexual history in order to exercise their substantive legal
rights and put forth a defense.
Hughes is something of an exception to the general rule that “evidence of
the alleged victim’s sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace
may perhaps be relevant,” whereas “non-workplace conduct will usually be
irrelevant.”140 In general, “evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct ‘on-duty,
at the workplace, and with named defendant’ may be discoverable, while
other evidence, such as non-workplace conduct, is irrelevant and
inadmissible.”141 This is consistent with the well-settled principle that the
welcomeness of a sexual advance “does not turn on the private sexual
behavior of the alleged victim.”142 In the interest of fairness to defendants,
however, courts will allow discovery of evidence regarding the plaintiff’s
conduct “on-duty, at the workplace, and with . . . named [d]efendants.”143

135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See supra Part II.A.1.
140. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment. But see id. r.
412(b)(2) (allowing the admission of evidence regarding a victim’s reputation, if the victim
has placed it in controversy).
141. See Chamblee v. Harris & Harris, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 670, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment)
(collecting cases).
142. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524, at *3 n.3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015) (emphasis added) (citing Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160
(2d Cir. 2000)), aff’d, 49 N.Y.S.3d 690 (App. Div. 2017).
143. Barta v. City of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996).
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In Wilson v. City of Des Moines,144 for example, the plaintiff sued her
employer for sexual harassment under Title VII, alleging that her supervisor
had “subjected her to repeated, vulgar workplace discussions that were
sexually offensive and that he touched her inappropriately on a number of
occasions.”145 The court admitted evidence to prove welcomeness—that the
plaintiff herself had engaged in sexually explicit language and conduct in the
workplace, including talking about vibrators and men’s sex organs.146 In
allowing the evidence, the court reasoned that, although “an alleged victim’s
private sexual behavior does not change her expectations about her work
environment,” the “evidence of an alleged victim’s particular behavior in the
workplace may be probative of welcomeness.”147
2. Damages Based on Mental Anguish
Sexual harassment plaintiffs often seek compensation for emotional
distress as part of their claims for damages.148 In order to preserve
defendants’ legal rights in such cases, courts will often permit some inquiry
by defendants into the private sexual histories of these plaintiffs.149 In
allowing this inquiry, courts have noted that discovery of a plaintiff’s
personal sexual history may be an intrusion of privacy and may deter some
plaintiffs from proceeding with their claims, but this inquiry may be
warranted where a plaintiff seeks compensation for mental anguish.150 The
rationale for allowing this inquiry is that it would be unfair to permit a
plaintiff claiming emotional distress to block discovery of evidence that may
show whether (1) “any emotional distress actually was suffered,” (2) “any
emotional distress that did occur had a serious impact on the plaintiff’s life,”
and (3) “any emotional distress was attributable, either in whole or in part, to
circumstances other than the alleged conduct of the defendant.”151 In other
words, where a plaintiff seeks to prove that he or she suffered emotional
distress as a result of the sexual harassment, the defendant has a right to show
that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused, at least in part, by other
events or circumstances.152
In Zakrzewska v. New School,153 for example, the plaintiff brought a sexual
harassment claim under NYCHRL against her employer, a university,
144. 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2006).
145. Id. at 640.
146. See id. at 639, 643.
147. See id. at 643.
148. See, e.g., Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008); Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 133; Bumpus v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No.
3512/07, 2009 WL 1141401, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009); Affirmation of Richard J.
Rabin at 2, Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008, 2015 WL 13345524 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 24, 2015).
149. See, e.g., Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *1; Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
No. 303092/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009) (discovery order).
150. See Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *2.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. 928 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 2010).
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alleging that her supervisor “subjected her to sexually harassing e-mails and
conduct.”154 The only damages that the plaintiff sought were for emotional
distress on the grounds that her supervisor’s alleged unwanted advances
changed the “plaintiff’s life markedly for the worse and seriously debilitated
her for a substantial period of time.”155 The plaintiff claimed that, as a result
of the alleged sexual harassment, she “lost interest in going out and
participating in social activities” and “experienced difficulty trusting
men.”156 The defendants sought to discover entries from the plaintiff’s diary
from the period during which the sexual harassment allegedly took place.157
In support of their discovery demands, the defendants argued that the diaries
were discoverable because of the likelihood that the diaries contained
evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s claims regarding the impact that the
alleged harassment had on her quality of life.158 Specifically, the defendants
argued that the diaries may have contained evidence (1) of intimate
relationships in which the plaintiff “divulged the sources of any emotional
turmoil she claims to have suffered,” (2) that the plaintiff responded to an
internet advertisement that sought sex with a “non-pro” in return for
payment, and (3) that the plaintiff engaged in electronic communications
with an unidentified male in which the plaintiff arguably offered to engage
in sex with a stranger in exchange for a meal in a “nice and glamorous”
restaurant.159 Such information, the defendants argued, would refute the
plaintiff’s claims.160 The plaintiff argued that discovery of her diaries should
be barred pursuant to Rule 412.161 While the court noted that “[i]ndividuals’
privacy interests in such circumstances are important and deserving of
protection” and that “there is a risk that permitting such discovery would
deter some individuals from pursuing meritorious claims,” the court
ultimately allowed the discovery in the interest of fairness to the
defendants.162 The court reasoned that, where a plaintiff seeks to prove that
he or she suffered emotional distress as a result of the sexual harassment, the
defense has a right to inquire into the plaintiff’s private sexual conduct in
order to show that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused, at least in
part, by other events and circumstances.163
Similarly, in Rivera, the plaintiff evidently sought six million dollars in
damages for pain and suffering that allegedly resulted from having been
sexually harassed by her supervisor.164 In defending the claim, UPS sought
documents and information related to the plaintiff’s marital troubles and
experiences with domestic violence on the grounds that such discovery was
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1036.
Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *1.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at *1–2.
Id. at *1.
See id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment).
See id. at *2.
See id.
Affirmation of Richard J. Rabin, supra note 148, at 3.
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necessary to ascertain other causes of the plaintiff’s alleged pain and
suffering.165 The court denied the part of the plaintiff’s motion that sought
to preclude such discovery and ordered that the plaintiff produce information
regarding domestic violence matters between the plaintiff and her
husband.166
C. How the NYSHRL Reforms May Exacerbate the Conflict Between the
Interests of Plaintiffs and Defendants
Because the reformed NYSHRL weakened two commonly used defenses
in sexual harassment cases, the “severe or pervasive” standard and the
Faragher-Ellerth defense, sexual harassment defendants will have to turn to
alternative means of defending against sexual harassment claims brought
under the NYSHRL with greater frequency.167 Two defenses that remain
available to sexual harassment defendants under the revised NYSHRL,
which may be relied on more heavily by sexual harassment defendants in the
wake of the NYSHRL reforms, include proving welcomeness and
challenging damages based on mental anguish.168 Part II.C.1 and Part II.C.2
discuss how these defenses may result in a greater intrusion of a sexual
harassment plaintiff’s privacy relative to the severe or pervasive standard and
the Faragher-Ellerth defense, respectively.
Given the expected increase in privacy intrusions flowing from the
elimination of the severe or pervasive standard and the Faragher-Ellerth
defense, one would likewise expect to see an increase in litigation over the
discovery and admissibility of sexual harassment plaintiffs’ sexual history
evidence. However, NYCHRL eliminated the “severe or pervasive” standard
and the Faragher-Ellerth defense in 2009169 and 2010170 respectively, and
there has been no apparent increase in litigation over the discovery and
admissibility of sexual harassment plaintiffs’ sexual history evidence under
the NYCHRL. Part II.C.3 concludes by discussing why the NYCHRL has
not seen an increase in such litigation and why the same may not hold true
under the revised NYSHRL.
1. The Severe or Pervasive Standard: High Bar, Low Intrusion
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, the application of the “severe or pervasive”
standard to sexual harassment claims under the NYSHRL made it relatively
easy for defendants to dispose of sexual harassment claims.171 The assertion
that the conduct in question was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain
a plaintiff’s claim did not require an inquiry into the plaintiff’s prior sexual
165. See id. at 6, 8.
166. Rivera v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 303092/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2009)
(discovery order).
167. See supra Part I.C.
168. See supra Part II.B.
169. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38 (App. Div. 2009).
170. See Zakrzewska v. New Sch., 928 N.E. 2d 1035, 1036 (N.Y. 2010).
171. See supra Part I.C.1.
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history or behavior.172 Instead, defendants could assert the defense that the
conduct at issue was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a sexual
harassment claim merely by comparing the conduct at issue to conduct that
the court had held to be insufficiently severe or pervasive in prior cases.173
Because the NYSHRL reforms eliminated the “severe or pervasive”
requirement and made a broader range of conduct actionable under the
revised NYSHRL, it will be more difficult for defendants to dispose of sexual
harassment claims by merely showing that the conduct at issue does not fall
within the universe of what the court considers actionable conduct.174 As a
result, defendants may instead have to turn to other defenses to dispose of or
mitigate sexual harassment claims, such as proving that the conduct at issue
was welcomed by the plaintiff or, where the plaintiff claims damages based
on mental anguish, that the plaintiff’s emotional distress was caused at least
in part by other events and circumstances. Both of these defenses may
require the defendant to seek evidence regarding the private sexual history of
the plaintiff that would not be necessary to support a defense based on the
“severe or pervasive” standard.175
2. The Faragher-Ellerth Defense: No Liability, No Intrusion
Prior to the NYSHRL reforms, the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth
defense to sexual harassment claims under the NYSHRL enabled an
employer to avoid vicarious liability in certain circumstances if the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually
harassing conduct, and the plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
otherwise avoid harm.176 The assertion that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing
conduct did not require an inquiry into the sexual history or behavior of the
plaintiff.177 Similarly, the assertion that the plaintiff-employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of the corrective opportunities provided by the

172. Note, however, that New York followed Title VII jurisprudence in requiring the
conduct at issue to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment and create a hostile working environment. See Palmer v. Cook, 108 N.Y.S.3d
297, 392 (Sup. Ct. 2019). Under this requirement, the harassing conduct must create both a
subjectively and objectively hostile work environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). The subjective requirement has led defendants to seek evidence
regarding plaintiffs’ prior sexual history or behavior, in order to show that a given plaintiff
was not subjectively offended by the conduct in question and that the conduct, therefore, did
not create a subjectively hostile work environment. See Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160
(2d Cir. 2000).
173. See Benson v. Solvay Specialty Polymers, USA, LLC, No. 1:16-CV-04638-CAP,
2018 WL 5118601, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state a
claim for sexual harassment under Title VII and citing “a number of cases in which similar if
not more egregious conduct was found to be insufficiently severe or pervasive”).
174. See supra Part I.C.1.
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. See supra Part I.C.2.
177. See, e.g., Pace v. Odgen Servs. Corp., 692 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (App. Div. 1999).
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employer, or to otherwise avoid harm, did not require an inquiry into the
sexual history or behavior of the plaintiff.178
Because the Faragher-Ellerth defense will “not be determinative” of the
employer’s liability under the revised NYSHRL,179 employers will not be
able to dispose of sexual harassment claims under the revised NYSHRL by
merely showing that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the corrective
opportunities provided by the employer. Instead, employers may have to turn
to other defenses to dispose of or mitigate sexual harassment claims, such as
proving that the conduct at issue was welcomed by the plaintiff or, where the
plaintiff claims damages based on mental anguish, that the emotional distress
was caused at least in part by other events and circumstances. Both of these
defenses may require the defendant to seek evidence regarding the private
sexual history of the plaintiff that would not be necessary to support a defense
were the Faragher-Ellerth defense still available.180
3. Comparison to the NYCHRL
One factor that might explain why there has been no apparent increase in
litigation over the admissibility of plaintiffs’ sexual histories under the
NYCHRL is the availability of mandatory, confidential arbitration or
prelitigation settlements under the NYCHRL.181 Scholars have noted that
these forms of alternative dispute resolution have led to a “shuttling of claims
out of the public court system.”182 For example, Fox News, which is
headquartered in New York and subject to the NYCHRL, paid millions of
dollars to settle harassment claims against Bill O’Reilly.183 The majority of
these claims were not filed in court.184 This “shuttling”185 may explain why
there has not been an increase in litigation over the discovery and
admissibility of evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment
plaintiffs under the NYCHRL.
The NYSHRL reforms, however, prohibit mandatory arbitration clauses
with respect to claims of discrimination.186 This may reduce the frequency
with which claims are shuttled out of the public court system. Consequently,
the missing increase in litigation over the discovery and admissibility of
evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment plaintiffs may
materialize under the revised NYSHRL. That said, the NYSHRL reforms’
prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses may be preempted by the

178. See, e.g., Poolt v. Brooks, No. 110024/09, 2013 WL 323253, at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan.
18, 2013).
179. See supra Part I.C.2.
180. See supra Part II.B.
181. See Nuñez, supra note 86, at 506.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted). Note that the
NYSHRL reforms expressly make sexual harassment a form of discrimination. Id.
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Federal Arbitration Act.187 If the NYSHRL reforms’ prohibition of
mandatory arbitration clauses is not enforceable, then sexual harassment
claims may continue to be settled or arbitrated out of court. Thus, the
predicted increase in litigation over the discovery and admissibility of
evidence relating to the sexual histories of sexual harassment plaintiffs may
not materialize under the revised NYSHRL.
III. HOW NEW YORK CAN ENCOURAGE SEXUAL HARASSMENT VICTIMS TO
COME FORWARD BY ENACTING ITS OWN CIVIL RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
A primary aim of the NYSHRL reforms is to make it “easier for workplace
sexual harassment claims to be brought forward.”188 This aim is congruous
with that of Rule 412, which seeks to protect alleged victims of sexual
misconduct from an “invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and
sexual stereotyping” and to encourage “victims of sexual misconduct to
institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.”189
Reconciling these objectives with the needs of defendants to delve into
certain aspects of victims’ sexual histories in order to put forth a defense may
be an impossible task. Some of the shortcomings of current civil rape shield
laws can be addressed, however, to provide more protections to sexual
harassment victims without impinging on defendants’ substantive legal
rights. This Part proposes that to further the goals of the NYSHRL reforms,
New York State should enact its own civil rape shield statute that eliminates
some of the gaps that plague Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield
common law. Part III.A explains why New York can depart from Rule 412
case law. Part III.B discusses why enacting a civil rape shield statute is the
best way to increase the protections of plaintiffs without depriving
defendants of substantive legal rights. Part III.C then discusses the specific
provisions that this Note proposes should be included in New York’s civil
rape shield statute.
A. Why New York Need Not Apply Rule 412 in Civil Cases
The New York State Legislature has signaled its intention to diverge from
federal civil rights laws by expressly stating in the revised NYSHRL that “the
provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights
laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the
provisions of this article, have been so construed.”190

187. See Penzer, supra note 62. In Latif v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the court held that a
nearly identical provision in a 2018 New York State bill that declared mandatory arbitration
provisions unenforceable with respect to sexual harassment claims was preempted by the
Federal Arbitration Act. No. 18-cv-11528 (DLC), 2019 WL 2610985, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June
26, 2019).
188. See Clark, supra note 11.
189. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
190. Assemb. 08421, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted).
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Given this divergence from federal law, New York can likewise diverge
from federal Rule 412 precedent if the Rule does not sufficiently aid in the
accomplishment of the remedial purpose of the revised NYSHRL. A New
York State civil rape shield statute would govern sexual harassment claims
filed in state courts.
Because the NYSHRL reforms have caused the NYSHRL to differ from
Title VII in several ways,191 plaintiffs can bring claims under the revised
NYSHRL that cannot be brought under Title VII. Specifically, a plaintiff
may have an actionable sexual harassment claim under NYSHRL for
harassing conduct that would not be sufficiently severe or pervasive to
sustain a claim under Title VII.192 Similarly, while a plaintiff cannot sue an
employer for sexual harassment under Title VII if that employer has fewer
than fifteen employees, that plaintiff will be able to sue that employer under
NYSHRL because the revised NYSHRL applies to employers regardless of
size.193 For these reasons, a plaintiff may bring a sexual harassment claim in
New York State court that cannot be brought in federal court. Consequently,
in litigating such claims, Rule 412 need not apply, and the New York State
courts could instead apply a New York State civil rape shield law, if the
legislature were to enact one.
B. Why a State Civil Rape Shield Statute Is the Best Solution
A New York civil rape shield statute is not the only possible solution to
closing the gaps in current civil rape shield laws without infringing on
defendants’ substantive legal rights. New York currently follows federal
Rule 412 precedent. Both Rule 412 and New York’s civil rape shield
common law suffer from the same shortcomings.194 One solution to these
shortcomings, therefore, might be to amend Rule 412. However, amending
the Federal Rules of Evidence is a difficult endeavor.195 Therefore, enacting
a state civil rape shield statute is the superior solution.
The enactment of a civil rape shield statute is also a superior solution
relative to waiting for New York’s common law to further develop. With
little state law precedent, the state courts have been forced to turn to federal
Rule 412 case law for guidance.196 However, given the New York State
Legislature’s intention to diverge from federal civil rights laws,197 it makes
little sense to wait for a rule to develop through federal cases concerning Title
VII. To give the NYSHRL reforms full effect, therefore, this Note proposes
that the New York State Legislature should enact a civil rape shield statute.

191. See supra Part I.C.
192. See supra Part I.C.1.
193. See supra Part I.C.3.
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. Daniel J. Capra & Liesa L. Richter, Poetry in Motion: The Federal Rules of Evidence
and Forward Progress as an Imperative, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1876 (2019).
196. See supra Part I.B.
197. See supra Part III.A.

2020]

A CRACK IN THE ARMOR?

1467

C. How a New York Civil Rape Shield Statute Can Better Protect Sexual
Harassment Plaintiffs Without Stepping on Defendants’ Rights
New York can enact a civil rape shield law that provides more effective
procedural safeguards and enforcement mechanisms than those of Rule 412
without impinging on the rights of defendants to a fair trial. Part III.C.1
discusses how New York can improve the procedures of Rule 412 by making
sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of purpose.
Part III.C.2 discusses how New York can adapt the procedures of Rule 412
so that they apply to defendants seeking to discover evidence, in addition to
defendants seeking the admission of evidence. Finally, Part III.C.3 discusses
how New York can expressly provide for sanctions against defendants who
do not comply with the proposed procedural safeguards.
1. Making Sexual History Evidence Presumptively Inadmissible
Regardless of Purpose
Rule 412 includes specific procedures that are designed to “assure that the
privacy of the alleged victim is preserved in all cases in which the court rules
that proffered evidence is not admissible.”198 Under these procedures, a
party seeking to offer evidence subject to Rule 412 is required to “file a
motion that specifically describes the evidence and states the purpose for
which it is to be offered.”199 Before the court may admit the evidence, it
must conduct an in camera hearing, during which the victim and parties have
a right to attend and be heard.200 This motion, as well as any related materials
and the record of the hearing, must be sealed unless the court orders
otherwise.201 These procedural requirements prevent a defendant from filing
a motion, which describes the evidence it seeks to introduce in detail, such
that these private materials automatically become a matter of public
record.202 Once part of the public record, anyone can obtain and/or
disseminate the private contents of those materials and invade a plaintiff’s
privacy before the court has had the opportunity to determine whether the
evidence is admissible.203 Entering such intimate details into the public
record may deter victims from coming forward with sexual harassment
claims.204 The Rule 412 procedures do not impinge on the defendant’s
ability to raise a defense but merely protect the alleged victim’s privacy as
the court determines whether the evidence sought is admissible.
The Rule 412 procedures are not completely effective in protecting the
alleged victim’s privacy, however. In Hughes, for example, despite the Rule
198. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
199. Id. r. 412(c)(1)(A).
200. Id. r. 412(c)(2).
201. Id.
202. See Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995).
203. See id.; supra Part I.A.2.
204. See Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008) (“[T]here is a risk that permitting such discovery would deter some
individuals from pursuing meritorious claims.”).
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412 procedures, the plaintiff’s affairs with four men became a part of the
public record even though the court ultimately ruled that Rule 412 barred the
defendants from subpoenaing the four men for information related to those
affairs.205
The inadequacy of the Rule 412 procedures in protecting the alleged
victim’s privacy is partially attributable to the text of the rule. Rule 412
prohibits the use of evidence (1) “offered to prove that a victim engaged in
other sexual behavior” or (2) “offered to prove a victim’s sexual
predisposition.”206 Although the purpose of this Rule is to encourage
“victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal
proceedings against alleged offenders,”207 the narrow wording of the text
limits the ability of the rule to fully achieve its purpose. Because the text
prohibits evidence based on what it is being “offered to prove,” many
defendants argue that evidence pertaining to a victim’s sexual behavior or
predisposition is admissible if it is offered to prove something else.208 In
Hughes, for example, the defendants arguably did not seek evidence
pertaining to the plaintiff’s romantic affairs to prove that the plaintiff engaged
in other sexual behavior or to prove the plaintiff’s sexual predisposition.209
Instead, the defendants sought evidence pertaining to the plaintiff’s romantic
affairs to prove that the plaintiff had actually pursued her alleged sexual
harasser in order to advance her career.210 Under Rule 412, if the evidence
is not being offered to prove that the victim engaged in other sexual behavior
or to prove the victim’s sexual predisposition, but is instead offered to prove
something else, such as welcomeness or damages, it is not obvious that the
evidence is subject to Rule 412 at all.211 It is, therefore, not apparent that the
Rule 412 procedures apply, and the defendant might not take the necessary
steps to prevent sensitive materials from automatically becoming a matter of

205. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327 F.R.D. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
206. FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
207. Id. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
208. See, e.g., Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(“Throughout these proceedings, the defendant has maintained that Rule 412 is inapplicable
to any evidence relating to ‘unwelcomeness.’ It argues that evidence relating to any prior
sexual conduct which [plaintiff] discussed at work is admissible, not as evidence of sexual
predisposition or other sexual behavior, but as direct evidence that she welcomed or even
created the sexually-charged environment.”).
209. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58.
210. See id.
211. See Socks-Brunot, 184 F.R.D. at 119. It is now well settled in some courts, including
the court in Socks-Brunot, that evidence relating to prior sexual conduct is subject to Rule 412
even if it is offered to prove welcomeness. See id.; see also Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel
Co., 895 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D. Va. 1995). However, the applicability of Rule 412 to sexual
history evidence offered to prove welcomeness has been less clear to other courts. See Wilson
v. City of Des Moines, 424 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court erred
in mischaracterizing sexual history evidence offered to prove welcomeness as “non-Rule 412”
evidence). Although, in Wilson, the Eighth Circuit ultimately ruled that evidence offered to
prove welcomeness was subject to Rule 412, the lower court’s error exemplifies the lack of
clarity among trial courts in determining the applicability of Rule 412 to evidence offered to
prove welcomeness. See id.
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public record before the court even determines whether the evidence is
admissible in the first place.212
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield statute
that makes sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of
what the evidence is being offered to prove. The statute can achieve this by
adopting language similar to Rule 412, but dropping the words “offered to
prove” such that all evidence regarding a victim’s sexual behavior or
predisposition is presumptively inadmissible, regardless of the reason that
the defendants are seeking to introduce such evidence. Then, by
incorporating the Rule 412 procedures, there will be little doubt that when
defendants seek evidence pertaining to a plaintiff’s sexual behavior or
predisposition, the defendants must take steps to ensure that such evidence
does not become a part of the public record before the court determines
whether the evidence is admissible.
2. Extending the Rule 412 Procedures from Admissibility to Discovery
The Rule 412 procedures “do not apply to discovery of a victim’s past
sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases.”213 Instead, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 governs the procedures in such cases and “courts should
enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect the victim
against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.”214 Rule 26
provides that “any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a
protective order in the court where the action is pending.”215 Thus, while a
sexual harassment defendant has an affirmative obligation to file a motion
under seal when seeking to admit evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual history,216
the obligation is on the sexual harassment plaintiff to request a protective
order when the defendant is seeking to discover, rather than admit such
evidence.217 As a result, intimate details of the private lives of civil plaintiffs
in sexual harassment cases are frequently made public when a defendant is
seeking the discovery, rather than the admission, of such evidence. This was
the case in Hughes, where the plaintiff’s extramarital affairs became a part
212. See Sheffield, 895 F. Supp. at 109; see also Wilson, 442 F.3d at 642–43 (noting that
the defendant did not follow the Rule 412 procedures).
213. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note to 1994 amendment.
214. Id. The advisory committee’s commentary on Rule 412 advises that, to avoid
undermining the purpose of Rule 412, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Rule
26 “to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.” Id. The
advisory committee’s commentary further notes that courts should “presumptively issue
protective orders barring discovery, unless the party seeking discovery makes a showing that
the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the
particular case, and cannot be obtained except through discovery.” Id. For example, in a
sexual harassment case, some evidence regarding the victim’s sexual behavior in the
workplace may be relevant, whereas evidence regarding the victim’s conduct outside of the
workplace will usually be irrelevant. See Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 327
F.R.D. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
216. See supra Part III.C.1.
217. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
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of the public record, even though the court ultimately ruled that Rule 412
barred the defendants from subpoenaing the four men for information related
to those affairs.218 Zakrzewska is similarly illustrative.219 There, the
defendants sought to discover portions of the plaintiff’s diary and the plaintiff
moved for a protective order pursuant to Rule 412 and Rule 26.220 In
opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, the defendants
revealed intimate details about the plaintiff’s sexual relations with third
parties.221 Although the court ultimately ruled that the diary entries were
discoverable,222 details about the plaintiff’s sexual relations with third parties
became a part of the public record before the court ruled on the
discoverability of the evidence.
The likely publicity of such intimate details may deter victims from
coming forward with sexual harassment claims,223 which undermines the
purpose of the NYSHRL reforms to make it “easier for workplace sexual
harassment claims to be brought forward.”224
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield law that
expressly incorporates the Rule 412 procedures any time a party seeks to
discover evidence regarding the victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition in
civil cases. By applying these procedures to the discovery of evidence
pertaining to an alleged sexual harassment victim’s sexual history, in
addition to the admission of such evidence, the legislature can increase the
protections afforded to sexual harassment victims without impinging on the
defendant’s right to a fair trial. These procedures will have no impact on the
defendant’s ability to discover potentially critical evidence, but they will
prevent intimate details about the victim’s private life from becoming a part
of the public record, in the event that the discovery does not lead to
admissible evidence.
3. Sanctions
This Note proposes that New York should enact a civil rape shield law that
also explicitly provides for sanctions against a party or attorney who fails to
follow the protective procedures described in Parts III.C.1 and III.C.2. In
order to be effective, the protective procedures must be accompanied by an

218. See Hughes, 327 F.R.D. at 58.
219. Zakrzewska v. New Sch., No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK), 2008 WL 126594, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 7, 2008).
220. See id. at *2.
221. Theodore L. Blumberg’s Declaration in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a
Protective Order at 8, Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594 (No. 06 Civ. 5463(LAK)), ECF No. 35.
222. See Zakrzewska, 2008 WL 126594, at *2.
223. See id. (“[T]here is a risk that permitting such discovery would deter some individuals
from pursuing meritorious claims.”).
224. See Clark, supra note 11.
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enforcement mechanism.225 Sanctions that punish defendants for violating
the protective procedures can serve as such an enforcement mechanism.226
In Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co.,227 for example, the court
sanctioned the defendant for “its callous disregard of the procedural
safeguards articulated in Rule 412(c)” where the defendant filed a motion
regarding sensitive information about the plaintiff without requesting that the
motion be filed under seal.228 The defendant sought to introduce evidence
that the plaintiff, an alleged victim of sexual harassment, had frequently
participated in sexually provocative discussions and activities in the
workplace to show that the plaintiff welcomed her alleged harasser’s sexually
suggestive behavior.229 Because the defendant did not follow the Rule 412
procedures, however, the court sanctioned the defendant by excluding all
testimony regarding the plaintiff’s alleged participation in sexually
provocative discussions and activities in the workplace, other than the
testimony of the plaintiff’s alleged harasser.230 By allowing the alleged
harasser’s testimony on this issue, the court noted that the defendant would
not be deprived of a fair trial.231 By excluding evidence that might be
relevant to the defendant’s defense, however, the court was able to punish
the defendant for violating the Rule 412 procedures.232
Where the court cannot exclude evidence as a sanction for a defendants’
failure to comply with the protective procedures described in Parts III.C.1
and III.C.2 without depriving the defendant of a fair trial, the court may
instead issue a fine as the appropriate sanction.233
CONCLUSION
By eliminating the “severe or pervasive” standard and the FaragherEllerth defense, the NYSHRL reforms may have increased the frequency
with which defendants turn to defenses that threaten plaintiffs’ privacy. This
may consequently deter victims of sexual harassment from coming forward.
Such a deterrent effect undermines the purposes of the NYSHRL reforms,
which sought to make it easier for victims of sexual harassment to bring
claims. New York’s current rape shield jurisprudence does not sufficiently
protect sexual harassment plaintiffs in order to counteract this deterrent
effect. The state should enact a civil rape shield statute that better protects
sexual harassment plaintiffs without further limiting defendants’ ability to
225. See Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105, 109 (E.D. Va. 1995).
226. See id. (noting that, “[b]ecause of the strong public policy concerns underlying [the
Rule 412 procedures], a flagrant violation of the [Rule 412 procedures] cannot go
unpunished”).
227. 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995).
228. See id. at 109.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 857–58 (1st Cir. 1998)
(fining the defense counsel in the amount of $500 for failing to follow the Rule 412
procedures).
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defend against sexual harassment charges. Such a statute should (1) make
sexual history evidence presumptively inadmissible regardless of what it is
being offered to prove, (2) include protective procedures that apply to both
the admissibility and discovery of sexual history evidence, and (3) expressly
provide for sanctions against defendants who fail to comply with the statute.

